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ARMENIAN MINORITY IN  GEORGIA:   
DEFUSING INTERETHNIC  TENSION 
ECMI Brief #6, August 2001  
Natalie Sabanadze 
 
 
Introduction 
 
July 2000 was the deadline for the withdrawal of two Russian military bases in 
Vaziani (near Tbilisi) and in Gudauta (Abkhazia). The agreement on Russian military 
withdrawal was reached at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, according to which the 
first two bases would be withdrawn by July 1 of the current year, to be followed by 
the two remaining bases in Javakheti (Southern Georgia) and Batumi (Western 
Georgia) in the near future.  Russia did not meet the deadline on the Gudauta base, 
which has become the main source of renewed Georgian-Russian political 
confrontation over the past few days.  However, as the talks on withdrawal 
intensified, the issue of  the Javakheti base also came to the fore.  Javakheti is the 
southernmost region of Georgia where the local population is predominantly 
Armenian.  Similar to Abkhazia, the situation in Javakheti is very sensitive and could 
be exacerbated by the Russian military withdrawal which is strongly opposed by the 
local Armenian population.  This at first sight benign case of base closure is thus 
likely to involve broader issues of regional political alliances, competing national 
interests, minority policies and a potential risk of yet another ethnopolitical 
confrontation in the region.1 
 
Among the most common descriptions of Javakheti found in both journalistic and 
scholarly literature is that of a "potential zone of conflict", "area waiting to explode" 
and in the more radical accounts 'the second Nagorno-Karabakh'.2  Despite many 
contrary predictions, Javakheti managed to maintain peaceful interethnic relations and 
to survive in peace and relativ  stability.  However, in order to maintain the fragile 
                                                  
1 For more details see the Russian military base at 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/08/F.RU.990825132236.html 
2 See Svante Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the 
Caucasus, Surrey:  Curzon Press, 2001, p. 181. 
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peace and cooperation much has to be done in terms of minority protection and 
power-sharing structures within Georgia.  What follows is a brief discussion of the 
Armenian minority in Georgia in the context of ongoing regional geopolitical 
changes, interests and vulnerabilities of the states involved.  In addition, Javakheti 
here is regarded as a zone of ethnopolitical tension which requires serious efforts, and 
well-developed preventive measures to avoid its deterioration into a zone of conflict. 
  
 
Background 
 
The region of Javakheti is located in the southern part of Georgia, nested against the 
borders of Turkey and Armenia.  It covers roughly 2589 square kilometers and, 
according to the 1989 census results, is home to approximately 107, 000 people.3  The 
central parts of Javakheti (Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda) are almost entirely 
Armenian.  As one moves towards the west, the population becomes more mixed with 
approximately 50 per cent Georgians and 50 per cent Armenians.  The Armenians of 
Javakheti came originally from the province of Erzurum in the Ottoman Empire, 
which was founded in the 13th century by Turkish tribes and lasted until 1918.  They 
fled the Ottomans and sought refuge within the borders of the Russian Empire, where 
they enjoyed significant cultural autonomy.  The earlier inhabitants of the region were 
the so-called Meskhetian Turks, who left for the Ottoman Empire with the Russian 
conquest, and those who remained were deported to Central Asia in 1944.4 
 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenian minority in Georgia was also 
concentrated in Tbilisi and Abkhazia.  Tbilisi was once the trading and cultural center 
of the Armenians, who formed an intrinsic part of the city population and represented 
the largest ethnic group living in Georgia.  In Abkhazia, Armenians even 
                                                  
3Mark Schapiro for the TACIS Project, Ethnic Minorities in the Caucasus: the Case of Javakheti. A 
VERTIC Assessment Report on the Javakheti Region of Georgia, with Recommendations, Map, and 
Economic Supplement, London: Vertic, 1997, p. 1. 
4 There are ongoing negotiations about the possible repatriation of Meskhetian Turks to their historic 
homeland in Georgia.  All the proposals with regard to the repatriation, however, are opposed by both 
the Georgian and Armenian population in the region.  The Georgian government fears that if Turks 
were resettled in an area of Southern Georgia, predominantly populated by Armenians, the clash 
between these two groups may become inevitable.  For more details on Meskhetian Turks, see Charles 
Blandy, The Meskhetians: Turks o Georgians? A People without a Homeland, Sandhurst:  Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, 1998. 
Also Liz Fuller, "End Home There's No Returning" at http://www.rferl.org/newsline/5-not.htm 
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outnumbered the local Abkhaz population.  However, since the collapse of the Soviet 
regime and the outbreak of the armed conflict in Abkhazia from 1992 to 94, the 
number of Armenians has declined significantly.  They have remained mostly in 
Javakheti, which, according to some analysts, is "as much 'Armenia' as it is 
'Georgia'".5  The main language spoken and written in Javakheti is Armenian.  The 
schooling is predominantly in Armenian, and among the currencies circulating are 
Armenian Drahms, Russian Roubles, and, to a lesser extent, Georgian Lari.  Each 
family in the region maintains strong ties with Armenia, and the communication 
between Javakheti and Yerevan seems much more intense than that with Tbilisi.  
 
Georgian central authorities exercise a varied degree of control over the region, with 
the most limited influence on its predominantly Armenian parts.  Lack of financial 
resources and difficult economic c nditions do not allow the government to invest in 
Javakheti, which is the most backward region in all of Georgia.  The population 
largely survives through small scale farming and trading.  The infrastructure, 
however, seems to be in ruins and requires signif cant human and financial resources 
to be restored.  The major employer in the region is the Russian military base, where 
about 70 per cent of the employees are local Armenians.  According to the CIPDD 
report, the cash contribution from the base is roughly equal to or sometimes exceeds 
the local budget,6 which makes the impending withdrawal of the base a risky and 
explosive issue.      
 
Even though Javakheti represents a zone of concern for the Georgian government, 
many people fear that talking about the possible conflict in the region may actually 
create a conflict where none exists.  The public opinion on the Javakheti issue is 
roughly divided in three camps.  The first considers Javakheti to be no different from 
the rest of Georgia and deems dangerous singling the region out.  The second believes 
Javakheti has serious ethno-political problems, which could be further aggravated by 
the possible withdrawal of the Russian military base.  And in a third view, Javakheti 
                                                  
5 Cited in Cornell, op.cit., p. 179. 
6 Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD), "Javakheti in Georgia: 
Problems, Challenges and Necessary Responses" at http://www.fewer.org/caucasus 
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suffers primarily from the economic underdevelopment and poverty, which may 
potentially lead to ethnic unrest.7 
 
The author believes that it is the combination of the last two views that can help to 
perceive the situation in Javakheti more accurately.  Even though too much emphasis 
on conflict or discourse of potential conflict may arguably contribute to the creation of 
conflict, the reverse is not true; i.e. not talking about the problem or ignoring it is 
unlikely to make the problem go away.  In this respect, the author sees Javakheti to be 
a clear case of ethno-political tension, which may be further complicated by the 
economic hardship and poverty.  The local Armenian nationalists voice demands 
granting Javakheti an autonomous status within Georgia or – in extreme cases – 
unification of the r gion with Armenia.  However, these demands have never been 
officially backed by the Armenian government, which continues to support the 
territorial integrity of the Georgian state. 
 
 
Armenian-Georgian Relations and Regional Dynamics 
 
Armenian-Georgian relations have never been simple.  The two nations always 
proclaimed close cooperation and emphasized cultural and religious links, but 
political interests often led them in two opposing directions.  Both from 1918 to 20 
and today, energy-dependent Georgia h s given priority to its relations with 
Azerbaijan.  This can partly be explained by their mutual interests in the Caspian oil 
production and transportation, and partly by Georgia's distrust of Armenian intentions 
in Javakheti.8   
 
The first ethnic tensio between Georgians and Armenians emerged, not 
surprisingly, during the rule of the nationalist Georgian government under the 
leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who rose to power from 1989 to 1992.  
Nationalistic attitudes of the Gamsakhurdia government were met with counter-claims 
of the Armenian nationalists in Javakheti, who started to demand regional autonomy 
                                                  
7 Ibid. 
8 See Stephen Jones, "Georgia: The Caucasian Context" at 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/123.htm. 
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and – in some extreme cases – secession.  The Armenian nationalist organisation 
Javakh is believed to have close ties with the Dashnaktsutiun in Armenia and seems to 
have mobilized nationalist sentiments in Javakheti.  Since 1992, Shevardnadze's new 
regime has tried to pursue more inclusive nationality policies and encourage 
participation of non-Georgian minorities in the state-building process.  These 
measures, however, need to be expanded in order to assuage the fears of minorities, 
which, in the words of Stephen Jones, "will remain obstacles to greater Caucasian 
cooperation".9     
 
Georgians fear the presence of the Russian military base in Javakheti a d its close 
links with the local Armenian population.  In addition, Armenians from Javakheti 
have refused to serve in the Georgian army.10  According to Svante Cornell's account, 
there have even been speculations about the creation of an all-Armenian battalion 
under the auspices of the Russian army.  The armament of Javakheti Armenians is 
another potential problem, which may even intensify with the possible Russian 
military withdrawal.  In the words of Cornell: "…a Russian troops withdrawal, were it 
to follow the pattern established over the past ten years, would doubtless leave large 
amounts of armaments in the hands of Javakh.  As such Tbilisi is in a way held 
hostage by the Russian military presence forced to accept its continued existence for 
fear of the armament of forces hostile to the government -- this is the case in 
Abkhazia, as well as Javakheti."11   
 
The position of the Armenian government with regard to the situation in Javakheti has 
been cautious and in several instances geared towards restraining the radical demands 
of the organisation Javakh.  Landlocked Armenia is dependent on Georgia for its only 
supply route.  In addition, both Georgian and Armenian governments are occupied 
with other ethnic problems, but Javakheti continues to be a hidden mine which could 
be activated should it become necessary.  One may argue that the mutual vulnerability 
of Armenia and Georgia has played a stabilizing role with regard to Javakheti.  
However, there is always the Russian factor much feared by Georgian authorities, 
which may disrupt the fragile balance if Russia finds it in its interests. Some Russian 
                                                  
9 Ibid, p.3. 
10 Cornell, op.cit., p. 179. 
11 Ibid, p.181. 
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military analysts have explicitly recommended that the Russian government 
encourage the annexation of Javakheti by Armenia if Georgia supports NATO efforts 
to restrict Russia's presence in South Caucasus.12 
 
The Russian influence in the Caucasus has been diminishing with the rising Western 
interests in the oil fields of the region.  Caspian oil has become the major source of 
regional rivalry in the 1990s, leading to the creation of an informal alliance between 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on the one hand and Armenia, Russia and Iran on the 
other.  The role of Javakheti in this political game, especially the position of Javakheti 
Armenians, becomes very important, since both the railway connection between Kars 
and Tbilisi and, more importantly, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline are scheduled to pass 
either through Javakheti or very close to it -- two projects that Armenia opposes.   
 
 
Implications for Minority Policy 
 
Apart from ongoing regional political games and conflicting interests, the situation of 
the Armenian minority in Georgia is exacerbated by two main factors.  One is 
economic underdevelopment and another the minority policy of the Georgian 
government and the general role of minorities in the ongoing formation of Georgian 
statehood and civic institutions.  The Armenian population lives in dire economic 
conditions, which largely reflects not so much the neglect of the Georgian authorities 
but the economic weakn ss of Georgia in general.  Degrading living conditions and 
economic hardship may provide legitimacy to the radical nationalist demands of the 
Armenian minority, which will further undermine the already fragile Georgian 
statehood.  Another legitimating fctor may become the shortsighted minority policy 
of the government, which is repeatedly criticized by the nationalist Armenians in 
Javakheti and is largely based on the neglect of minority issues.   
 
Even though the Georgian constitution provides for equal treatment of minorities and 
the legislature has all provisions against discrimination, more work has to be done for 
the enforcement of those provisions and, more importantly, for the building of the 
                                                  
12 Nezavisimaja Gazeta, M rch 27, 1997, also cited in the CIPDD report. 
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civil society and inclusive understanding of Georgian citizenship.  It is easily 
detectable that the Armenian minority in Javakheti does not have a strong sense of 
Georgian citizenship, and the mutual support of the Georgian state and its Armenian 
minority is very limited.  Even though Georgians have a strong national identity and 
the sense of Georgian nationhood has been developed and propagated over the last 
few centuries, today Georgia has to remodel its ethnic conception of nationhood into a 
more civic and inclusive one.  This requires not only proper legislation, but also 
consistent governmental efforts to disseminate civic ideals and turn the written laws 
into practice.  This would increase the stake of national minorities in the Georgian 
state and make them feel as its integral and loyal parts.  
 
 
 
 
